“La plus belle des ruses du diable est de vous persuader qu’il n’existe pas” or more common to an English-speaking audience “The finest trick of the devil is to persuade you that he does not exist.” The deception in the room most subtle of all is that which isn’t in the room but denies the room even exists.
Steven Lukes’ “third dimension of power” is a concept I have spoken about before in previous essays. The concept was first introduced in his influential 1974 work Power: A Radical View. This third face of power is arguably the most insidious—precisely because it is invisible. It doesn’t merely suppress opposition; it shapes the very conditions under which people think, so that certain
Lukes critiques earlier theorists (like Dahl) who only saw power as decision-making in visible conflicts. He proposes three levels: The First Face describes decision-making power: A gets B to do something B would not otherwise do. The Second Face is concerned about agenda-setting power: A prevents B from raising certain issues at all. The Third Face relates to ideological power: A shapes B’s perceptions, preferences, and beliefs so deeply that B cannot conceive of certain ideas, resistances, or truths.
It is the third face that ideologically suppresses the truth before it has even taken flight. This form of power operates through social norms, education systems, cultural narratives, language and framing as well as media and moral discourse. Rather than forbidding truth, it makes certain truths unthinkable. It cultivates a world in which the status quo feels natural, inevitable, or even moral.
Noam Chomsky’s idea of “manufacturing consent” aligns with this where the media doesn’t just tell you what to think—it defines the field of what can be thought. Issues outside this frame aren’t “debated”—they’re simply never raised. This third dimension closely parallels George Orwell’s conception of ideological control in 1984. The Party doesn’t just lie; it makes truth itself irrelevant:
“Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past.”
Here, reality is manufactured. The deepest power is not in crushing rebellion but in making rebellion inconceivable. This is exactly Lukes’ point: ideological power prevents alternative visions from being imagined.
Rather unsurprisingly, a man on the Steven Lukes, like many on the New Left, developed his theory of the third dimension of power as a critique of establishment power structures: governments, corporations, and ideologies that, in the mid-20th century, were largely conservative, capitalist, and hierarchical. His aim was to expose how dominant ideologies manufacture consent and suppress dissent, not through coercion, but through the internal shaping of thought itself. But here lies the deep and uncomfortable irony; In the decades since Lukes formulated his theory, the cultural and institutional centres of power; media, education, tech, the arts, HR departments, NGOs, and even segments of the judiciary, have become increasingly dominated by progressive or left-leaning ideologies. And yet, the very tools Lukes gave us to interrogate the ideological shaping of consciousness are now rarely used to examine how the left exercises that same power. The most relevant concerns a discipline that is presented as virtue itself but within conceals a devilish lie.
There is a foundational internal contradiction in Human Rights discourse where contingency undermines its necessary principle of universality. I intend to examine the duplicity of modern human rights and how it betrays the very pedestal it must, by necessity rest upon- to safeguard and protect the most vulnerable of all human beings. Through analysis of the restrictive definition of genocide in international law and the dehumanization processes that precede mass atrocities, this article argues that human rights frameworks fail when they permit certain categories of humans to be relegated to “contested” status. The essay demonstrates how this foundational inconsistency creates dangerous precedents that ultimately compromise the entire human rights project. Reality has become so distorted that well-funded and far-reaching organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch engage in mass pretence while simultaneously performing the very type of dehumanising processes they warrant to reject.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) begins with the assertion that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” Yet contemporary human rights discourse reveals a profound contradiction: while claiming universality as its core principle, it simultaneously permits the exclusion of entire categories of humans from moral consideration through various contingent criteria and such contingency fundamentally undermines the universality claim and creates dangerous precedents that compromise the entire human rights framework.
Human rights theory rests on the principle that rights inhere in humans qua humans, not because of any particular characteristic or achievement beyond their biological humanity. As Gewirth (1978) argues in Reason and Morality, the foundation of human rights lies in the basic fact of human agency, which requires no additional qualifications. Similarly, Griffin (2008) contends that human rights protect human dignity, which is inherent to the human condition rather than contingent upon external recognition. However, contemporary applications of human rights discourse systematically violate this principle by introducing contingent criteria that determine which humans qualify for protection. The concept of “personhood”, as distinct from biological humanity, for example, creates a two-tiered system where some humans are granted full moral consideration while others are relegated to contested status. This distinction, while presented as philosophically sophisticated, actually represents what Lukes (2005) would identify as the third dimension of power – the ability to shape the very categories of thought and determine what counts as legitimate moral concern.
Definitions like “genocide” also perpetuate this contradiction when they are narrowly tailored to such an extent that when categories do not fit the definition, the consequences that might follow its application to facts, renders those facts illegitimate. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) defines genocide as acts “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” This definition, while historically significant in response to the Holocaust, creates dangerous exclusions through its narrow specificity. As Lemkin (1944), who coined the term, originally envisioned genocide as encompassing broader patterns of systematic destruction of human groups, the current legal definition artificially restricts the scope of protection. Given that 73 million unborn babies have been massacred through often State funded or advertisement schema allowing for abortion, which conditions human status upon arbitrary philosophical constructs like personhood (which are also inconsistently applied, for example there is a growing personification of natural entities like rivers and mountains in order to provide them with protected status- see the Whanganui river in New Zealand granted legal personhood in 2017).
The restrictive nature of this definition becomes problematic when considered alongside Lukes’ (2005) analysis of power structures. By limiting genocide to specific group categories, the definition fails to address systematic destruction of humans based on other characteristics – developmental stage, cognitive capacity, or social recognition. This limitation is not merely technical but represents a fundamental flaw in how international law approaches human protection.
Schabas (2009) notes that the restrictive definition has practical consequences, as it allows massive destruction of human life to occur without triggering the international community’s obligation to prevent and punish genocide. The focus on group membership rather than the systematic nature of destruction creates loopholes that can be exploited by those who wish to engage in mass elimination while avoiding legal consequences.
Historical analysis reveals that every major human rights violation has been preceded by a process of dehumanization that relegates victims to a lesser moral category. As Kelman (1973) demonstrates in his study of sanctioned massacres, the process of moral disengagement requires first establishing that victims belong to some category that places them outside normal moral consideration. The framing of certain categories of humans as “subjects of philosophical debate” rather than bearers of inherent rights follows this same pattern. When biological humanity becomes insufficient for moral consideration, and additional criteria such as consciousness, viability, or social recognition are introduced, the foundation for systematic exclusion is established. This process represents what Bandura (1999) identifies as “moral disengagement” – the psychological mechanism through which ordinary moral standards are deactivated.
The danger then, lies not in the specific criteria chosen but in the very principle of contingency itself. Once human rights become conditional on meeting certain thresholds, the entire framework becomes vulnerable to redefinition by those with definitional power. As Dworkin (1993) argues in Life’s Dominion, the introduction of such criteria transforms rights from inherent protections into privileges granted by those with authority to determine worthiness. The internal contradiction in human rights discourse manifests most clearly in the simultaneous advocacy for human rights protections while maintaining systems that deny the most fundamental right – life itself – to entire categories of humans. This inconsistency reveals what might be termed “selective universality” – the application of universal principles only to those deemed worthy of consideration.
Finnis (1980) argues that this selective application undermines the rational foundation of human rights theory. If rights are truly inherent to human nature, then no external criteria can legitimately determine their application. The introduction of contingent qualifications transforms the entire framework from one based on objective human dignity to one based on subjective social recognition.
This transformation has profound implications for the credibility and effectiveness of human rights discourse. When advocates simultaneously claim universal human rights while excluding certain categories of humans from protection, they engage in what might be called “performative contradiction” – undermining through action the very principles they claim to defend.
The acceptance of contingent criteria for human rights protection creates a dangerous precedent that extends far beyond any specific application. Once the principle of contingency is established, the scope of who qualifies for protection becomes subject to redefinition by those with social and political power. This represents precisely the kind of arbitrary authority that human rights discourse originally sought to constrain.
Historical examples demonstrate the consequences of this approach. The Nuremberg Laws, apartheid legislation, and other systematic exclusions of humans from moral consideration all followed the same pattern of introducing seemingly reasonable criteria that ultimately facilitated massive violations of human dignity.
As Lifton (1986) documents in The Nazi Doctors, the process of medical killing began with the introduction of quality-of-life criteria that gradually expanded to encompass broader categories of victims.
The contemporary acceptance of contingent criteria for human rights protection follows this same logical structure. While the specific criteria may differ, the underlying principle – that biological humanity is insufficient for moral consideration – creates the foundation for systematic exclusion and potential atrocities. The restrictive definition of genocide and the broader acceptance of contingent criteria for human rights protection have significant implications for international law and policy. When legal frameworks permit systematic destruction of humans to occur without triggering protective obligations, they fail in their fundamental purpose of preventing atrocities.
The solution requires what might be called “definitional courage” – the willingness to extend protection based on biological humanity rather than constructed personhood. This approach would align international law with the original principles of human rights discourse while providing more comprehensive protection against systematic destruction. Such an approach would necessitate broader definitions of genocide that focus on the systematic nature of destruction rather than specific group characteristics. It would also require abandoning the distinction between biological humanity and legal personhood that currently permits certain categories of humans to be excluded from protection.
The internal contradiction in contemporary human rights discourse – claiming universality while permitting systematic exclusion through contingent criteria – represents a fundamental threat to the entire human rights project. The restrictive definition of genocide also exemplifies this problem by allowing massive destruction of human life to occur without triggering protective obligations. The solution requires returning to the foundational principle that rights inhere in humans qua humans, without additional qualifications or contingent criteria. This approach would restore consistency to human rights discourse while providing more comprehensive protection against systematic destruction. It is unlikely, however, to happen anytime soon because of the way most of the institutions have been captured by the left who seem intent on persisting in mass slaughter, a methodology they are well acquainted with.
In many Western societies today, abortion is positioned as a matter of personal choice, moral pluralism, and democratic contestation. It is spoken of as a “contentious issue,” open to public debate, compromise, and policy fluctuation. However, this framing itself presupposes something very specific: That the moral status of abortion is open to legitimate disagreement, unlike certain other practices (e.g., slavery, torture, paedophilia, genocide), which are treated as non-negotiable moral wrongs, beyond discussion or political compromise.
This difference in framing reflects the deepest level of ideological power—Lukes’ third face:
The power to shape the parameters of moral perception, so that some ideas become contestable, and others are sealed off as untouchable truths.
Abortion is framed primarily in terms of bodily autonomy, “reproductive rights,” and women’s health.
This precludes certain metaphysical or moral questions from being asked—e.g., When does human life acquire moral status? or What obligations do we owe to the unborn? The framework sets the terms of what can be thought, not just what can be said.
In liberal democracies, some issues are considered open to pluralism (abortion, euthanasia, drug use), while others (child sacrifice, slavery) are not, yet, this designation is itself ideological. The unquestionable status of some moral positions, and the debate-status of others, is not determined by logic or universal principles—it is the product of ideological conditioning. If slavery, for example, were reframed today as a matter of “economic freedom” or “cultural tradition,” society would not permit its discussion. The very framing would be rejected as morally obscene. So why does abortion remain open to debate in polite society? Because the dominant cultural framework has rendered the moral status of the unborn contingent, not absolute. That’s Lukes’ third face in action: shaping perception before thought even arises. Neverthelss, the liberal media, those paragons of virtue, witting or unwittingly perpetuate the very thing they tend to abhorred by. They pretend at the very least to be neutral but to frame abortion as “contentious” is not a neutral act. It is to place it within the zone of moral negotiability—something that Lukes’ third face of power makes possible. If the dominant institutions believed abortion were akin to slavery, they would no longer allow debate. That they do allow debate—within narrow, curated terms—is a testament to which worldview is currently shaping perception from below the surface.
There is nothing so loathsome as the deceiver who demands others to genuflect to a cause which the deceiver himself distorts. The fact that organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have the gall to lecture the world on basic human rights and fundamental freedoms whilst, at the same time, engaging actively in campaigns to distort those rights by arbitrarily imposing ad hoc conditions is evil in its most wicked form. At least a devil in hooves will shake you from your ignorance as they approach, the devil who speaks softly, with lacquered affect concealing mal intent, will cut you down as you invite them in for tea in your own home.
International law recognises non-derogable rights, or rights that cannot be suspended, limited, or violated, even in times of war, public emergency, natural disaster and national crisis. They are considered inviolable because they protect the core of human dignity and existential integrity. Yet all rights are meaningless if you are allowed to be killed. Not only are these rights non derogable but retain Erga omnes status, ergo omnes” is Latin for “toward all.” In international law, an erga omnes obligation is a duty owed by a state toward the international community as a whole. This means that every state has a legal interest in the protection of that right and any state can hold another accountable for violating it, even if not directly affected. Yet, and here’s the kicker, even “non-derogable” rights, which claim to be foundational and inherent, are often built on a contested, contingent, and institutionally sanctioned definition of personhood.
When I saw Amnesty Ireland defend the indefensible during the repeal the 8th campaign that would legalise abortion in Ireland, I saw the mask fall off the devil. It is like seeing someone who wills your protection while smashing you in the face with a hammer. This truth is tragic when you realise that not only do lies exist, that the lies are defended by those who will say they defend the truth, but worse, they will convince many that the lies don’t even exist in the first place.